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Chapter Seven

The State of Constructive Conflict in
Northern Ireland
Lee A. Smithey

Northern Ireland’s conflict has been hailed as a textbook example of peace
making, a model of consociational politics. The ending of violence in the
region has been remarkable, even as it has required decades of painstaking
work. The peace process has involved transition from ethnic polarization and
bloody conflict over mutually exclusive political claims to political conflict
through institutionalized politics and cultural contestation. Is Northern Ire
land’s famous trajectory away from armed struggle toward politics complete,
given that ethnic and political division and violence remain? After all, stu
dents of Irish and British history often note the cyclical or episodic nature of
the struggle for sovereignty on the island. On the other hand. Northern Ire
land has never been as equitable or as globalized as it is today.
Peacebuilding and conflict transformation occur across multiple domains:
political, economic, cultural, and psychological. Each is contentious, as one
would expect in any modem society. More apt questions include whether the
peace process is stalling in some domains and proceeding apace in others.
How does unequal progress impact the overall trajectory of the conflict? I
will argue that Northern Ireland’s conflict remains primarily constructive
because it has been sufficiently institutionalized, and politics have been
adopted by the majority of parties to the conflict. Many grievances have been
addressed, and while the cultural domain has increasingly become an epicen
ter of contention, efforts are under way to facilitate the symbolic public
expression of political and ethnic identity through the arts and historical
initiatives and to encourage incremental identity change and more porous
group boundaries.
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Conversely, we must acknowledge that the ethnic, political, and geo
graphic landscape remains divided. Infrastructures of violent organizations,
both state and nonstate, persist, though they are greatly diminished. Social
disparities remain that fuel ethnopolitical polarization, and without a truth
recovery process, there has been little success in developing a shared under
standing of the conflict. At the very time during which attention turns to
ethnic and political-identity claims during centennial events, government
funding cuts to the arts and culture budget have been announced, further
undermining the longer-term prospects of dealing effectively with the past. It
seems that Northern Ireland’s incomplete transition from destructive to con
structive conflict has stalled in some respects, producing concern that the
people of Northern Ireland have not yet completed the path to a diverse
democratic society in which political contention is sufficiently normalized
and institutionalized so as to be constructive for all.

CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT
The sociologist Georg Simmel ([1908] 1955) theorized conflict as a form of
human relationship and argued that conflict is an important and constitutive
part of social life. Lewis Coser (1956) later identified a variety of ways in
which conflict could be considered functional for groups. A tradition was
thus established in which conflict is seen not as a problem to be eliminated
but as a form of social interaction with important implications for human
rights, social justice, and quality of life. Certainly, violent conflict can gener
ate enormous suffering; the atrocities and world wars of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries generated growing demands by peace movements for
alternatives. International organizations (such as the United Nations), human
rights law, and diplomacy all emerged to offer institutional channels through
which to manage and resolve particular conflicts. Simultaneously, nonviolent
resistance movements have developed increasingly powerful ways to conduet conflict without violence. All the while, our understanding of conflict
has become increasingly sophisticated; conflicts can prove immensely com
plicated, involving multiple parties, asymmetric power relations, deep histor
ical roots, social psychological and emotional underpinnings, and shifting
socioeconomic and political circumstances.
In 1998, Louis Kriesberg first published his book. Constructive Conflicts,
in which he systematically addressed many of the complicated dynamics of
conflict, and importantly, he distinguished constructive conflict from de
structive conflict according to the means by which they are conducted and
their outcomes. He characterized destructive conflicts as those involving
means that subject many participants to harm and even threaten their very
survival. These often involve the use of coercion or violence resulting in the
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unilateral imposition of terms and the humiliation of opponents, a situation
ripe for retaliation and renewed conflict. Constructive conflict is more often
conducted through persuasion and negotiation instead of coercion, leading to
mutual problem solving, outcomes that are acceptable to all parties, and a
foundation for cooperative relationships that are important for dealing with
future disputes (Kriesberg 1998, 21-22).
Many conflict management methods are based on linear models leading
to adjudicated or negotiated outcomes and agreements. However, Kriesberg
(1998) points out that conflicts will usually oscillate between constructive
and destructive means and outcomes, though constructive means are more
likely to drive a conflict toward a constructive outcome (ibid., 22). Thus,
many scholars have come to speak of “conflict transformation” processes
that acknowledge the multidimensional and often protracted nature of conflicts that requires not only institutional responses but grassroots work to
incorporate the interests and perspectives of stakeholding groups and encour
age the use of constructive means of carrying out conflict (Lederach 1997;
Rupesinghe 1995; Ryan 2007; Smithey 2011).
Conflict transformation is a process, a realignment of relationships,
understandings, and the conditions under which disputants coexist. It is a
complex series of often slow and uneven processes that influence one another
and make for a nonlinear transition that can be difficult to discern or predict.
This is the case in Northern Ireland, a region that has experienced a remark
able shift from thirty years of open conflict between paramilitary organiza
tions and the British state to more than twenty years of ceasefires and the
development of power-sharing governance. Yet Northern Ireland remains in
a state of transition. Military and paramilitary organizations and activity have
greatly diminished, but sectarian and political contention remains. In a report
to the US-Ireland Alliance, Peter Shirlow (2013) describes the transition as
following two primary tracks. “In sum, the peace process appears to be
moving at two speeds in which some communities remain caught in a perpet
ual cycle of poverty, sectarian asperity and intra-community devotion whilst
others are shifting into less antagonistic positions. These shifts are paralleled
by a decline in voting and political participation.” Shirlow’s comments re
veal the uneven and multidimensional nature of Northern Ireland’s transition.
In the following sections of this chapter, I will describe several domains in
which Northern Ireland’s conflict has become constructive yet contains de
structive characteristics, or may be stalling.
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CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT AND OUTCOMES IN
NORTHERN IRELAND
Paramilitary and military violence probably characterizes Northern Ireland’s
conflict for most people. In all, more than 3,700 people were killed, and ten
times as many injured in political violence (Smyth and Hamilton 2003,
18-19). Direct Rule was imposed in 1973, ending forty years of unionist
(pro-British)' political dominance but also closing off local politics as an
avenue for conflict. Today, by Kriesberg’s standards of constructiveness, one
can characterize conflict in Northern Ireland as constructive. Even during the
Troubles, the means for carrying out the conflict were not exclusively vio
lent. Political negotiations and power-sharing were attempted but failed in
1973, and one can also identify a few important moments of nonviolent civil
resistance. By the early 1980s, secret back-channel talks had begun in a long
and ultimately successful bid to reach a negotiated agreement in 1998.

Political
Northern Ireland constitutes a rich and fascinating case of conflict transfor
mation. One need only consider the decline of political deaths over the
course of the Troubles (Smyth and Hamilton 2003) and review the history of
the peace process in which paramilitary organizations (the Provisional Irish
Republican Army [PIRA] in particular) agreed to ceasefires, engaged in
negotiations, and entered formal politics. Tremendous progress has been
made in the realm of formal politics, and one should note that contemporary
political relationships expressed through power-sharing and British and Irish
state visits were hard won through over twenty years of painstaking negotia
tions. The development of political alternatives was shepherded by advo
cates—such as John Hume and politicians in the Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP) and Alliance party—of nonviolent conflict methods,
through years of armed struggle and counterinsurgency campaigns. Interest
ingly, much forward-looking thinking also came from within paramilitary
organizations and the ranks of political prisoners (Novosel 2013; Shirlow
2010; Smithey 2011,58).
The fascinating history of events and efforts that brought bitter and mis
trustful opponents together to share governance is far too complicated to
relay here, but it is worth noting that, as in many conflict situations, peace
making efforts and violence coexisted even from the early days of the Trou
bles (Kriesberg 2015). As early as 1973, negotiations among the Ulster Un
ionist Party (UUP), the centrist Alliance, and the constitutional nationalist
SDLP produced a short-lived power-sharing Executive to govern Northern
Ireland based on negotiations that produced the Sunningdale Agreement in
1974 (Melaugh 2014; Tonge 2006, 26-27). (The Belfast Agreement of 1998

The State of Constructive Conflict in Northern Ireland

113

resurrected many of the fundamental consociational mechanisms established
by the Sunningdale Agreement.) The shift away from armed struggle and
British counterinsurgency has been marked by multiple phases of high-level
state negotiations, such as those that produced the Anglo-Irish Agreement
between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald
in 1985 and the Brooke-Mayhew talks that helped produce the 1993 Down
ing Street Declaration and the 1995 Framework Documents.
However, high-level public talks were accompanied by backdoor and
often secret talks, such as those held by Hume (the SDLP leader) and Gerry
Adams (the Sinn Fein leader), not to mention contact between republicans
and the British government from 1990 to 1993 (and even as far back as 1986)
(Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchaga 2009, 112-23). In some cases, religious
leaders, such as Father Alec Reid, (former priest) Denis Bradley, and Arch
bishop Robin Fames played important roles as couriers or honest brokers.
Progress came in fits and starts against a backdrop of ongoing violence, but
the outlines of a political process slowly took shape and eventually led to the
Belfast Agreement and the establishment of a power-sharing Assembly and
Executive. Implementation of the accords took nearly a decade to complete,
but the Assembly has remained in operation since devolution in 2007. Never
theless, complaints persist about the inability of politicians at the Stormont
(Northern Ireland’s parliamentary body) to legislate and develop effective
social policy.
Still, the extent to which politics has become a shared endeavor is remark
able. During the 2014 Northern Ireland Council elections, the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, formerly the most diametrically op
posed parties, maintained their positions as the largest parties, each with
nearly a quarter of the votes cast. Since 2007, when the firebrand and politi
cal provocateur the Reverend Ian Paisley became First Minister alongside
Martin McGuinness, a former commander in the Provisional Irish Republi
can Army, DUP and Sinn Fein politicians have held the posts of First Minis
ter and Deputy First Minister. Similarly, at the level of local politics, the first
Sinn Fein Lord Mayor, Alex Maskey, was seated in 2002, and the party has
regularly held the seat since.
Taboos and symbolic thresholds have been crossed as British and Irish
leaders have demonstrated that old rivalries and hatreds can be surmounted,
even as they continue to hold incompatible positions about the ultimate status
of Northern Ireland. Ian Paisley and Bertie Ahem jointly opened the Battle of
the Boyne Heritage Center in 2008, crossing ceremonial swords in jest at the
event. Queen Elizabeth paid a state visit to the Republic of Ireland in 2011,
followed by a reciprocal visit to Britain by President Michael D. Higgins, the
first such visit by an Irish head of state. Even more spectacular, Sinn Fein’s
Martin McGuinness, Northern Ireland’s Deputy First Minister, has met the
Queen in Belfast twice. Among Catholics, a constitutional preference for a
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united Ireland has dropped by 50 percent to 28 percent since the signing of
the Belfast Agreement, with 46 percent preferring to remain part of the
United Kingdom, within a devolved government (ARK 2013; Morrow, Rob
inson, and Dowds 2013).

Social and Economic
From the confiscation of lands by Protestant settlers to colonial-era penal
laws, systematic economic and social discrimination against local Irish and
Catholics (and historically against nonsubscribing Protestants) has been a
major grievance that fueled nationalist resistance to British rule. Similarly,
housing policies constituted one of the poles of discontent around which the
civil rights movement coalesced. Sixty-three percent of Catholic homes
(compared with 72 percent of Protestant homes) had hot water, a fixed bath
or shower, and indoor toilet in 1971 (McKenna 2014). Civil rights activists
conducted sit-ins in public housing units to demand redress of economic
exclusion. The movement lost support under repeated attacks against civil
rights marches and the murder of unarmed protesters on Bloody Sunday in
1972. Support for violent resistance grew, fueling the emergence of the Pro
visional IRA.
With the institution of Direct Rule from Britain, a range of policies to
ameliorate economic disparities between Catholics and Protestants was es
tablished, though significant improvement did not materialize until the 1980s
(Ruane and Todd 1996, 163; Russell 2012). In 1971, the local Stormont
government established the Northern Ireland Housing Executive to oversee
the allotment of social housing, an issue around which the civil rights move
ment coalesced (McKenna 2014). A Standing Advisory Commission on Hu
man Rights (SACHR) was formed in 1973, followed by the 1976 Fair Em
ployment (Northern Ireland) Act and the Fair Employment Agency, all of
which imposed new standards of equality. The MacBride Principles estab
lished in 1984 called on US companies to only conduct business in Northern
Ireland with organizations that upheld fair hiring and employment practices.
Shareholder activists used the principles to demand corporate reform, thir
teen states passed legislation, and the US Democratic Party incorporated
them into its 1984 Presidential platform. Adrian Guelke (1996) credits the
MacBride Principles campaign for having a significant impact on the passage
of the 1989 Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act (Guelke 1996, 526-28),
and President Bill Clinton signed the principles into federal law in 1998
(Cochrane 2007,218).
Today, Protestant and Catholic shares of the workforce are indistinguish
able, as measured by the respective percentages of their populations that are
available for work. Similarly, the differential in unemployment rate has prac
tically disappeared (8 percent for Catholics and 6 percent for Protestants in
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2012)2 (Nolan 2014, 85-87). Progress can be traced directly to the conflict
over civil rights out of which the Troubles were bom, and the transformation
of conflict remains linked to economic and development concerns. Northern
Ireland remains segregated, though ethnonational attitudes are becoming less
polarized, and considerable effort has been put into funding peacebuilding
initiatives that seek to undermine out-group fears, prepare people for engage
ment across the ethnopolitical divide, and build new inter-community net
works (Byrne et al. 2009; Eyben, Morrow, and Wilson 1997).

Cultural and Social Psychological
The social work of building relationships in a traumatized and segregated
society constitutes a primary sector of any shift toward constmctive conflict.
Like the long history of political negotiation described above, a multitude of
community relations organizations, nongovernmental organizations, youth
clubs, churches, and para-church organizations have challenged sectarianism
throughout the Troubles (Fitzduff 2002; Liechty and Clegg 2001). Indeed,
the unique government-funded quasi-nongovemmental Northern Ireland
Community Relations Council (founded in 1990) exemplifies the attention
paid to dealing with difference and sectarianism. Admittedly, however, de
termining the impact of community relations work has proven difficult me
thodologically (Cochrane and Dunn 2002; Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld
2002).
When political disputes fall along socially constructed lines of out-group
categorization, they can become exponentially difficult to transform. In such
“identity conflicts,” mutual social psychological tendencies to construct
group boundaries emerge (Lederach 1997, 8). Commitments to one’s own
group and corollary fears of “other” groups become emotionally charged and
contribute to structures of division. Trauma deepens group loyalties, height
ens out-group antagonisms, and increases the likelihood of violent retalia
tion, generating a downward spiral of intractability (Brewer and Higgins
1998; Cairns 1994; Jenkins 2008; Kriesberg, Northrup, and Thorson 1989;
Ross 2001; Smithey 2011, 11-14; Weiner 1998). In the process, resistance
itself can take on existential tones that can radicalize conflict (Simmel [1908]
1971,87).
Conflict in Ireland has long been underpinned by psychological and cul
tural divisions, though it was only in the last twenty years of the nineteenth
century that religious, ethnic, and political currents aligned to produce the
prominent divisions between Catholic-Nationalist-Republicans and Protestant-Unionist-Loyalists that, in turn, contributed to the partition of Northern
Ireland in the first quarter of the twentieth century and the Troubles during
the last quarter of the century.
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Mistrustful attitudes are in transition and yet persist. Survey research
indicates that, despite progress in political arrangements, residential patterns
and social attitudes in Northern Ireland remain polarized (Devine and Schubotz 2004, 2-3; Hayes and McAllister 2009; Leonard 2008; MacGinty, Muldoon, and Ferguson 2007; McAuley 2004; Shirlow 2003). Since 1989, in
creasing numbers of both Protestant and Catholic adults report that commu
nity relations are better than five years ago, though the trend has been inter
rupted during periods of political contention or communal violence (Morrow,
Robinson, and Dowds 2013). As recently as 2010, 67 percent of Catholic
adults and 60 percent of Protestant adults reported improved community
relations, but the trend has declined significantly since (to 50 percent of
Catholics and 44 percent of Protestants) (ARK 2010; 2013). When asked
about future community relations, only 40 percent of adults in Northern
Ireland in 2013 said they thought relations would be better in five years.
Those figures are down from 64 percent in 2007 (ARK 2013; Devine 2014).
Meanwhile, youth in segregated communities in Belfast continue to experi
ence intercommunal tension and attending mental health and behavioral
problems (Shirlow 2013).
As for sharing resources and spaces, clear majorities of both Protestant
and Catholic adults would prefer to live in a mixed-religion neighborhood,
and Protestant attitudes have been catching up with Catholics’ in this regard
(Morrow, Robinson, and Dowds 2013). The same sort of preferences persists
across Northern Ireland for mixed-religion workplaces (71 percent in 2013)
and schools (56 percent in 2013) (ARK 2013; Devine 2014). Similarly, a
comparison of census data collected in 2001 and 2011 reveals a sharp decline
from 55 percent to 37 percent in the proportion of “single identity” wards in
Northern Ireland, though street-level segregation remains (Nolan 2014, 115).
In short, seventeen years after the signing of the Belfast Agreement, the
social psychological divisions that have characterized conflict in Northern
Ireland for approximately 130 years remain. We can identify important
trends of softening attitudes across the ethnopolitical divide, but they are
gradual, incomplete, and have been shown to reverse themselves in moments
of political uncertainty.
The cultural and social psychological dimensions of the conflict are deep
ly intertwined with collective action. Parades, music, murals, commemora
tive events, memorial sites, and flags continue to serve as vehicles for the
construction of polarized ethnonational identities. Parades, which have pro
liferated to over four thousand events per year, serve as sites for face-to-face
contestation as nationalist and loyalist residents’ groups literally face off in
the streets to protest one another’s rituals. For republicans, music, language,
murals, and commemorations (among other expressions) rally adherents to
the cause and allow both dissident organizations (that have rejected the peace
process) and Sinn Fein (a party that chose politics over armed struggle) to
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connect themselves to the republican mythos. For unionists and loyalists,
parades, murals, bonfires, and bands constitute ways to eontinue to express
their loyalty to Britain (or at least a British identity). Such public symbolic
displays serve as a kind of virtual test of the security of the union with Great
Britain. To the extent they are challenged, Protestant unionists and loyalists
perceive threat.
Understanding the ways in which the meaning of the conflict is con
structed by parties to the confliet is important. Even more important for the
topie of this book is the way in which the meaning of the eonflict and thus the
relationships between opponents is interpreted and framed, setting new prec
edents for further antagonism or eooperation. A reeiprocal relationship exists
between the sehemata through whieh parties understand the conflict and one
another and the ritualistic actions they undertake to construct those schemata
and collective identities. Therefore, a crucial part of conflict transformation
involves the reconstruction of cultural schemata through reflection and the
modification of ritualistic actions (Smithey 2011).
Elsewhere, I have argued that conflict in Northern Ireland has shifted
from the martial realm into the cultural realm, and we can understand the
shift as a feature of the eonstructive trajectory of Northern Ireland’s conflict
(Smithey 2011). Symbolic displays, which can range from antagonistic to
invitational, constitute a crueial shift away from overtly violent forms of
interaction and thus help open space for dialogue and cooperation. We
should not be naive; because symbolic displays and the narratives of sacri
fice, grief, and pride that accompany them evoke deep emotions, they can
also easily reinscribe polarized collective identities and refresh old narratives
of mistrust.
However, public rituals and symbols can become sites of experimentation
in which the narratives and meanings behind the symbols may be reinter
preted or made more historically sophisticated, partieularly in a transitional
period after violence has ended. This dynamic has underpinned a signifieant
portion of community relations work in Northern Ireland that aims to eneourage even the most committed nationalists and unionists to participate in the
unraveling of ethnopolitical division. Examples include “cultural traditions”
work, mural redesign schemes that encourage the removal of paramilitary
themes, initiatives to redesign and choreograph bonfire events, and efforts to
make parades more public-friendly. Murals, for example, have proliferated in
recent years, but they are also collectively taking on a new complexion.
Research conducted by Lee Smithey, Gregory Maney, and Joshua Satre
(2013) reveals that the number of mural sites in West Belfast has been
growing since 2009, but a eomparison of surveys of all murals in West
Belfast in 2009 and 2010 reveals that paramilitary themes are being replaced
by non-paramilitary themes, albeit often retaining ethnonationalist themes
(especially in republican neighborhoods). Murals with paramilitary themes
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appear most frequently in densely populated, structurally disadvantaged, and
highly segregated areas. However, they are mostly absent from areas near
peace walls, suggesting a conscious attempt to improve community relations
(Maney and Smithey 2011).
The modification of symbols offers opportunities for reflection and dis
cussion about the narratives to which symbols refer. Such moments become
opportunities to invite others into mutual exploration of one another’s histo
ries. As nationalistic narratives are subjected to scrutiny and critique, they
can begin to incorporate multiple views and humanize former adversaries.
Commemorative events related to conflict in Ireland often serve as highly
symbolic and deeply charged rituals that construct polarized ethnonational
identities. With this in mind, academics and organizations, such as the Com
munity Relations Council, have sought to proactively establish a frame of
historical exploration and mutual dialogue as Northern Ireland enters a
decade of potentially contentious centennial commemorations (approximate
ly 1912-1922) that will reflect on World War I, the ascendance of the physi
cal force tradition in republicanism, and the formation of the state of North
ern Ireland. However, some academics have expressed pessimism over
whether official state-sponsored commemorations can deliver the kinds of
nuanced narratives that might help deconstruct the masculine nationalist ones
that characterize ethnopolitics in Northern Ireland and north-south and eastwest relations. Dominic Bryan and Mike Cronin, in particular, note that acts
of commemoration and the choreography of remembrance are as important
as historiography because they are important means by which exclusive
group identities are constructed (Bryan et al. 2013; Smithey 2011).
Conflict always requires elaborate meaning-making in the public sphere
as opponents justify their actions to themselves and bystanding publics, and
work to mobilize activists and sustain their struggle. Northern Ireland is no
exception and arguably has developed an especially rich and colorful sym
bolic landscape, including music, street art, parades, commemorations, uni
forms, emblems, and more. Much as conflict moved from the martial realm
into the political realm, it has also moved into the cultural realm with a
proliferation of traditional rituals and symbolic displays that are often mod
ified in ways that incrementally make them less oppositional. All of these
shifts together drive the constructive trajectory of conflict in Northern Ire
land, even as political and cultural fault lines remain and threaten to destabi
lize the progress that has been made.

External Intervention
Elsewhere I have argued that conflict transformation is most effective when
it is driven by legitimate community and political leaders who command the
cultural capital necessary to frame new possibilities in ways that resonate
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with diverse local populations (Smithey 2011). However, influence by exter
nal parties is important and often necessary to address power asymmetries
(Kriesberg 2015). The long history of interventions in Northern Ireland can
hardly be covered here, but several prominent examples stand out.
The United States has repeatedly attempted to facilitate conditions condu
cive to negotiation, and American statespeople have often served as media
tors or observers during political negotiations. During the campaign leading
up to the 1992 US Presidential elections, then Arkansas governor Bill Clin
ton opened the door for a new phase of external intervention when he stated
that he thought it could be helpful for the US government to reverse itself on
a long-standing policy and permit a visa for Gerry Adams, the President of
Sinn Fein, to travel to the United States. At the time, the British and Irish
governments considered Adams a terrorist, and his voice was banned from
news broadcasts in both countries. After Clinton won his first term in office,
Adams was granted a visa in January 1994, infuriating the British govern
ment (English 2003, 273). However, allowing Adams to travel and speak in
the United States contributed to a rehabilitation of Adams and Sinn Fein that
positioned and encouraged them to move toward politics and the negotiations
that were to come (Guelke 1996, 534). Clinton also granted a visa in 1994 to
Provisional IRA founder Joe Cahill (who had already been deported twice
previously) so that he could help convince republican supporters in Irish
Northern Aid (NORAID) of the wisdom of the new republican strategy to
pursue negotiations (Guelke 1996, 525).
President Clinton continued to play an important role by lending interna
tional status to the peace process, though unionists and loyalists have long
harbored suspicions about American intervention, especially given the favor
able view of nationalism and republicanism that has prevailed in American
public opinion. Nevertheless, the annual White House St. Patrick’s Day cele
brations that involve political leaders from Ireland—from both north and
south—have continued to direct attention to the region and support Northern
Ireland’s ongoing peace proeess by renewing international expectations.
Perhaps the most high-profile and crucial intervention involved the inter
national committee of US senator George Mitchell, Canadian general John
de Chastelain, and former prime minister of Finland Harri Holkeri. The US
senator chaired the group that issued the Mitchell Report determining that
all-party talks should be initiated before the decommissioning of weapons
but that decommissioning should begin during negotiations. The report pre
sented six principles, including a commitment to “democratic and exclusive
ly peaceful means of resolving political issues” (Hennessey 2000, 100-101).
Mitchell went on to chair the difficult negotiations that led to a power
sharing system of government established by the Belfast Agreement of 1998
(Mitchell 1999). Between 1997 and 2011, his colleague. General John de
Chastelain, chaired the Independent International Commission on Decom-
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missioning (IICD) that oversaw the proeess of deeommissioning paramilitary
weapons.
Diasporas may also wield significant influence in the trajectories of
intractable conflicts, especially in a globalizing world wired for mass media
and instantaneous communication (Ellis 2006). The Irish diaspora in Ameri
ca played a notable role in the transformation of conflict in Northern Ireland.
The participation of the Clinton administration resulted from decades of
organizing and lobbying. Irish American activism during the 1970s was char
acterized by NORAID and its support of armed republican struggle and the
voices of prominent Irish American politicians, such as Senator Edward Ken
nedy and Speaker Tip O’Neill, who criticized British policy in Northern
Ireland and worked with SDLP leader John Hume and the Irish government
to introduce constitutional nationalism into Irish American political dis
course (Cochrane 2007, 219). However, during the 1980s and 1990s, a new
wave of interest groups, including the Irish National Caucus and the Friends
of Ireland, became the primary political voices of Irish America. By the
1990s, during a critical phase of strategic realignment toward politics within
the republican movement in Ireland, the aptly named Americans for a New
Irish Agenda successfully cultivated President Clinton’s support. Guelke
(1996) characterizes the influence of Irish Americans on the peace process:
“In the first place, the growth of influence of the Irish-American lobby has
not stemmed from a weakening of the American government’s opposition to
political violence, but rather from a moderation of Irish-American attitudes
towards the conflict’’ (536). Feargal Cochrane (2007) goes further to credit
Irish American activists with generating sufficient “soft power” to facilitate
and support republicans’ move toward negotiations. The 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York City in 2001 consolidated that shift. The
revulsion against terrorism that the attacks generated sealed off the possibil
ity of a return to Irish American support for armed struggle and pressed the
IRA to take further steps toward ending its campaign (Cochrane 2007, 226).
It is worth noting that, in the latter phases of the ongoing peace process,
Protestant unionists and loyalists have turned to the Scots Irish diaspora in
the United States to amplify their cultivation of Ulster Scots heritage and
identity. As conflict has moved into the cultural sphere in Northern Ireland,
some unionists and loyalists have sought to claim a “parity of esteem” with
nationalist culture through the development of the Ulster Scots dialect, poet
ry, literature, music, and history. They have often pointed to early waves of
immigration from the Ulster region to the United States in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries and the role Protestants have played in American politi
cal leadership, claiming that seventeen of the first forty-four Presidents have
Ulster Scots ancestry (Ulster Scots Agency 2009). One also finds connec
tions made between Ulster Scots and country or Appalachian music as well
as plentiful reflections on the US and UK alliances during the first and
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second world wars. Most of these efforts have taken place since the turn of
the twenty-first century, and they differ from the political lobbying and acti
vism by Irish Americans who supported nationalism during the Troubles.
Instead, ties with the United States have provided a form of cultural legitima
cy that has helped to reassure some Protestants during a period when they
have otherwise felt unsure about their status in the wake of the Belfast/Good
Friday Agreement (Smithey 2011, 133-35, 165-66).
External monetary support constitutes another prominent feature of
peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. As Sean Byme et al. explain, “The idea is
that economic assistance will create a milieu conducive to peacebuilding by
providing resources to stimulate constructive inter-group contact and mutual
engagement, diminish social marginalisation, encourage local networks, and
tackle structural inequalities to build the peace dividend and peaceful coexis
tence” (2009, 339). Funding from the European Union (EU) and Internation
al Fund for Ireland (IFI) have supplemented local and national (British and
Irish) funding streams. The IFI, sponsored by the United States, the European
Union, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, was established with the aim of
“promoting economic and social advance and encouraging contact, dialogue
and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland”
(International Fund for Ireland 2005, 6). The IFI’s 2014 annual report reveals
that, to that date, the fund had committed £713 million (€897 million) (Inter
national Fund for Ireland 2014, 8).
The European Union Special Support Programme for Peace and Recon
ciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland, established
in 1994, has provided even larger sums of financial support. The Peace I
program (€667 million; 1995-1999) emphasized economic development and
social inclusion and was followed by the Peace II program (€1.2 billion;
2000-2004 and 2005-2006 extension) that incorporated a focus on reconcili
ation work that the Peace III fund amplified (€225 million; 2005-2006).
Though the Peace III fund was thought to be the last major infusion of EU
peace funding, the Special EU Programmes Body has opened a new round of
public consultation over how to spend over €500 million of Peace IV and
Interreg funds from 2014 to 2020 that will focus on shared education, shared
spaces and regeneration, community relations, health, and environmental
sustainability (BBC 2014).
The less well-known Interreg Programme has provided EU funding for
cross-border initiatives aimed at promoting regional cohesion and infrastruc
ture for economic cooperation. Today Interreg funding addresses both the
Northern Ireland/Republic of Ireland border and Western Scotland, treating
the Irish Sea as a maritime border. Interreg appears to have had little direct
effect on grassroots relations, though it has helped build cross-border rela
tions among local politicians (Potter and Egerton 2011; Special EU Pro
grammes Body 2013).
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In short, external funding for community relations work and economic
development are well-established and highly intentional attempts to maintain
a constructive trajectory for conflict in Northern Ireland. An overwhelming
consensus about the impact of such funding has not emerged, but there is
clear proof that most practitioners have found IFI and EU funding produc
tive.
ECHOES OF DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT
As of 2016, eighteen years after the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was
signed, conflict continues in ways that echo the sectarian polarization be
tween Catholics and Protestants that helped fuel the conflict during its worst
stages. To the extent that relationships are intended or are perceived as coer
cive, intimidating, or threatening, we can say that the conflict retains destruc
tive threads.
Political
Armed struggle has not entirely disappeared in Northern Ireland. While the
Provisional IRA began decommissioning its weapons on October 23, 2001,
other organizations, such as the Real IRA (or New IRA), the Continuity IRA,
and Oghlaigh na hEireann continue to carry out paramilitary operations, and
campaign organizations, such as the 32 County Sovereignty Movement and
Republican Sinn Fein, do not reject the use of physical force in the pursuit of
a united Ireland. Fortunately, few attacks in recent years have resulted in
deaths, as dissident organizations are often infiltrated by intelligence and
security forces. Numerous bombs have been intercepted, but when bombings
and assassinations occur, they are roundly condemned by all parties in the
Northern Ireland Assembly.
Notable examples include the killing of two soldiers in 2009 outside
Massereene Army Base as they emerged to retrieve a pizza delivery. Two
other soldiers and two pizza deliverymen were wounded in the attack. In
2010, Kieran Doherty and Bobby Moffett were killed by their own republi
can and loyalist paramilitary organizations, respectively. Ronan Kerr, a Cath
olic police officer, was killed by a booby trap placed in his car, provoking
local and international outrage. On November 12, 2012, a prison officer,
David Black, was assassinated as he drove to work. In April 2012, a large,
six-hundred-pound bomb was found on the border, and nearly a year later, on
March 4, 2013, police and army units intercepted a van in Derry modified to
carry four mortars.
Violence by loyalist organizations, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), occurs less frequently;
their weapons are formally to have been decommissioned and their organiza-
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tions transformed (often into historical or voluntary organizations), but in
fighting and occasional incursions at flashpoint interfaces, such as a coordi
nated attack on Catholic homes in the Short Strand area of East Belfast in
2011, have suggested that paramilitary capabilities remain. A steady but
diminished tempo of pipe bombings and arms finds constitutes background
noise beneath the media coverage of efforts to sustain working political
structures.^
The violence of the Troubles also continues to dog contemporary politics.
As the Legacy Investigations Branch of the Police Service of Northern Ire
land (PSNI) and the forthcoming Historical Investigations Unit continue the
work of “policing the past” formerly carried out by the PSNI’s Historical
Enquiries Team, the possibility remains that current political leaders may be
at risk of prosecution, thus destabilizing the political process. The PSNI’s
attempts to seize the “Boston College Tapes,” academics’ recorded inter
views with paramilitary leaders from both republican and loyalist organiza
tions, represent a particularly high-profile example of the challenges of rec
onciling power-sharing with the destructive dynamics of the Troubles. In
May 2014, as a result of the Boston College case, Gerry Adams, the president
of Sinn Fein and elected member of Bail Eireann (a house of the Irish
Parliament) for County Louth, was arrested and held for four days of ques
tioning about the 1972 abduction and murder of Jean McConville. The theat
rics of a republican leader being interrogated by police had the potential to
undermine republican support for the police service and stir old animosities
over internment policies during the Troubles.
Investigations by the police ombudsperson into collusion between loyalist
paramilitaries and security and police officials have also strained trust and
political relationships. In February 2014, a court case involving an alleged
IRA bomber revealed that, during the peace process, nearly two hundred
republicans were quietly given letters of assurance that they would not be
arrested or prosecuted for past crimes. The First Minister of Northern Ireland
threatened to resign (and thus collapse the Assembly) unless an inquiry was
launched.
Despite ongoing dissident violence, political power-sharing, particularly
between the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein, has proven remark
ably stable. At the time of writing, more than nine years of continuous
governance from Stormont have passed. However, in September 2015, the
Northern Ireland Executive came within a hairsbreadth of collapsing after the
Ulster Unionist Party withdrew its one minister from the Executive, and the
Democratic Unionist Party, for over a month, repeatedly withdrew and rein
stated all but one of its ministers, blocking normal business but forestalling a
formal suspension or direct rule by the British government. The August 12
murder of Kevin McGuigan, a former member of the Provisional IRA, and
the subsequent arrest of leading republicans, including Bobby Storey, Sinn
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Fein’s chairman in Northern Ireland, precipitated the crisis. Party talks com
menced on September 21, and an independent panel was appointed by the
British government to produce an independent assessment of paramilitary
organizations. The report provided enough cover for the DUP ministers to
return to their posts on October 20.
As of late 2016, Northern Ireland’s political system faces a new and
wholly unexpected challenge: the departure of the United Kingdom from the
European Union, or “Brexit.” On June 23, 2016, 51.9 percent of UK citizens
voted to leave the European Union while 48.1 percent voted to remain.
Majorities in England and Wales voted to exit, and majorities in Northern
Ireland and Scotland voted to remain. The potential impacts on trade and
finance are vast, with Northern Ireland reported to bear greater economic
risks than the other regions of the United Kingdom (Phinnemore and
McGowan 2016, 7, 15). Equally concerning, however, are the implications
for political arrangements in Northern Ireland. Fears over immigration and
borders fueled the pro-Brexit campaign and raise questions about the open
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland that would
become the United Kingdom’s new land border with the European Union.
With the rising specter of a renewed hard border, Sinn Fein almost immedi
ately raised the prospect of a “border poll” on the unification of Ireland that
would also allow the majority to “remain” voters in the North to maintain
their status as EU citizens. It is also not clear what Brexit will mean for the
substantial European funding of peacebuilding initiatives, the work of the
cross-border political institutions that are fundamental to the Belfast Agree
ment, or the legal status of the agreement itself, which is based in part on the
European Convention on Human Rights. Perhaps the mediation and negotiat
ing skills that produced the political peace process in Northern Ireland can be
harnessed to generate new, workable post-Brexit arrangements if the govern
ment initiates the process of separation from the European Union.
Until the political crisis of 2015, the principle of consent, proportional
representation, and consociational systems of mandatory coalition sufficient
ly managed fears that one quarter could take advantage of another. However,
those very mechanisms have come under criticism. The rules that allow
either of the main political communities to veto legislation mean that the
Assembly has found it difficult to legislate efficiently. Growing public dis
satisfaction with the pace of reform, particularly with respect to social wel
fare, has prompted First Minister Peter Robinson to propose a move away
from the “mandatory coalition” among the political parties. Safeguards es
tablished by the Belfast Agreement assign ministerial positions in the Execu
tive based on the D’Hondt system of proportional representation. Thus, ma
jor parties may not be excluded. A new system of “voluntary coalition”
would permit a government to be formed by any willing coalition, even if a
system of weighted voting became necessary to ensure some form of cross-
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community representation. Republicans have reacted negatively, with Sinn
Fein fearing exclusion and a return to the majority rule that oversaw discrim
ination against Catholics between the formation of the state and the imposi
tion of Direct Rule in 1973 (Cochrane 2013, 304-5; Devenport 2014).
Some have expressed concerns about the fundamental way in which the
Belfast Agreement contributes to bifurcated identity politics. By including
reassurances about the cultural aspirations of the two main identity camps
(Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists) through commitments to “en
hance and protect” the Irish and Ulster Scots languages, the Agreement may
legitimize monolithic identity categories and inhibit attempts, both in politics
and in civil society, to move across ethnopolitical boundaries and make them
porous (Nic Craith 2002; 2003; Smithey 2011, 162, 175-76). It is these
overly simplified categories into which people retreat in times of threat and
uncertainty.
Social and Economic
I have noted important corrections across a number of economic fronts, such
as jobs and housing, and these undoubtedly contributed to the circumstances
in which political power-sharing could be established. However, even with
greater procedural equality, housing remains a site of contention as the grow
ing Catholic population creates demand for housing at interface areas, where
Protestants feel encroached upon. Housing results from the 2011 census offer
some confirmation of Protestant fears, revealing that a steep decline in sin
gle-identity local government wards has occurred primarily in Protestant
areas (Nolan 2014, 114-15).
Nowhere is the tension over control of space more evident than at the
“peace lines” or high barrier walls that separate Protestant and Catholic
neighborhoods in working-class areas, mostly in Belfast. More peace walls
have been constructed since the Good Friday Agreement was established
than existed in 1998. They have increased from twenty-two when the agree
ment was signed to a total of fifty-three in 2014, a conservative measurement
of division that is down from the 2013 figure of fifty-eight (Nolan 2012, 10;
2014, 67-70). In a 2012 report, the Belfast Interface Project identified nine
ty-nine “security barriers and forms of defensive architecture” across Belfast
(Belfast Interface Project 2012, 11). Despite high-profile initiatives by local
politicians, statutory bodies, and major peace funds, most proposals have
been blocked by local residents who feel that the walls remain necessary to
protect them from vandalism and confrontations with neighbors. However,
the first of the walls owned by the Housing Executive to come down was
removed in February 2016.
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Cultural
The shift of conflict away from armed struggle and into cultural contention is
a pillar of conflict transformation and may be welcomed. However, when
rituals, such as republican commemorations and Orange parades or the hang
ing of nationalist flags, conjure exclusive political claims and memories of
the Troubles (intentionally or unintentionally), they can perpetuate trauma,
sustain mistrust, and polarize attitudes between Protestants and Catholics.
Increasingly, one hears reference to “culture wars” in Northern Ireland.
Flags and parades constitute the most heated front of such culture wars. A
small number of summertime loyalist parades regularly spins off riotous
confrontations with police, especially during the massive July 12 parades that
celebrate the victory of the Protestant King William of Orange over the
Catholic King James at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. With the ending of
violence twenty years ago, the number of parades each year has increased to
a record level of nearly four thousand (primarily unionist and loyalist).
Though only a small number of parades are contentious, those that local
nationalists protest or that require policing gamer much media attention and
become annual indicators of mistmst across the ethnopolitical divide. A con
frontation outside of St. Patrick’s Catholic Church in 2012 led to days of
rioting when a republican activist filmed a loyalist band playing a sectarian
tune as it marched in circles in front of the church. Annual restrictions placed
by the Parades Commission on a North Belfast parade past the Ardoyne
storefronts led in 2013 to a perpetual encampment on the Woodvale Road
and weekly protests by loyalists that only ended after an agreement was
brokered in September 2016.
Political flags constitute another site of contention. The erection of Union
Jacks, Tricolours, and paramilitary flags has long been understood as a
means for marking out ethnically segregated territory. Loyalists, in particu
lar, hang flags to coincide with the parading season and the annual July 12
celebrations. For a small number of people, flags are a seasonal ritual and a
public expression of collective identity, but for others they can be annoying
or even intimidating. Between 2006 and 2013, significant majorities of Prot
estants and Catholics (ranging from almost 70 percent among Protestants to
just over 80 percent for Catholics) reported that they do not support flying
flags from lampposts in their own neighborhoods (Kelly 2014). A decision
by the Belfast City Council in December 2012 to limit the days on which the
Union Jack is flown over City Hall brought flags to the forefront again.
Loyalists conducted sustained protests and marched to City Hall on several
occasions. Paul Nolan et al. have identified 55,521 acts of protest related to
the flying of the Union Jack at City Hall between December 3, 2012, and
March 17, 2013(2014,108).
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The issue of symbolic contention was deemed sufficiently problematic
that US ambassador Richard Haas and professor Meghan O’Sullivan con
vened Northern Ireland’s political leaders in talks about parades and flags.
By the end of December 2013, their negotiations had produced a proposal
that most feel politicians are unlikely to carry forward. With regard to flags,
Haas and O’Sullivan called for the establishment of a Commission on Iden
tity, Culture, and Tradition to hold public discussions throughout Northern
Ireland in hopes of generating grassroots momentum in the absence of politi
cal leadership. They also called for a streamlined process for conducting
investigations into historical crimes, a mental trauma service, and a new
governmental body, the Authority for Public Events Adjudication, to replace
the Parades Commission in setting conditions on contentious parades.
Renewed talks sponsored by the British government in 2014 saw US
secretary of state John Kerry appoint former US senator Gary Hart as a
special envoy to Northern Ireland to assess how the US government might
support further peace and reconciliation efforts. Northern Ireland secretary of
state Theresa Villiers and the political parties managed to reach new agree
ments on the establishment of an opposition at Stormont, the budget, and
welfare reform through the Stormont House Agreement of December 23,
2015. Issues over flags were to be handed to a new Commission on Flags,
Identity, Culture and Tradition for further discussion, and several new bodies
were to be established for the gathering of information and investigations of
Troubles-related deaths. It appears the cultural realm will continue to serve
as a primary battlefield on which ethnopolitics are waged, a far more con
structive alternative than armed struggle, but one on which dialogue and
cooperation are often strained.
MAINTAINING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRAJECTORY
A great deal of evidence points to the conclusion that Northern Ireland has
been engaged in a process of constructive conflict transformation, even from
the early days of the Troubles, confirming that conflicts are rarely purely
constructive or destructive at any given point in time. Though the civil rights
movement was eventually subsumed by armed struggle, it pushed political
and economic equality to the top of the agenda in Northern Ireland. Direct
Rule brought the systematic implementation of policy designed to end eco
nomic discrimination against Catholics. Elaborate and often clandestine
negotiations that eventually produced ceasefires and a power-sharing govern
ment represent a clear shift in the means of conflict from armed struggle and
counterinsurgency to politics.
Conflict transformation is, however, a multifaceted and fluid process with
the potential for constructive or destructive outcomes. As we have seen, the
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very activities that one could consider constructive often hold the potential
for breakdowns and threaten a return to destructive means of conflict. As
sessing the constructive or destructive nature of a conflict in transition is
nearly always going to be difficult. No clear metric exists. Indeed, as Simmel
([1908] 1971) reminds us, all social relations are a matrix of harmony and
disharmony (72-74). The question is whether a case can be made that suffi
ciently constructive dynamics are at play in relation to destructive risks.
Oscillation between the two poles is to be expected. As Kriesberg (1998)
argues, “Struggles generally consist of a sequence of conflict modes, with
varying degrees of constructiveness and destructiveness” (22). Plus, as John
Paul Lederach (2005) tells us in The Moral Imagination, there is an impor
tant element of immeasurable serendipity in peacebuilding. For that matter,
serendipity may work in favor of a destructive trajectory. Contention over
unrelated matters may devolve into ethnopolitical conflict, or important lead
ers may be lost. The death of the Progressive Unionist Party (Loyalist) politi
cian David Ervine comes to mind. Ervine, a former UVF combatant who
served jail time, played a critical role in pioneering the peace process. His
funeral in 2007 in East Belfast drew thousands, including prominent republi
cans, but his absence in faltering loyalist politics has been felt ever since.
Even if we cannot yet be precise about the pace or quality of conflict
transformation in Northern Ireland, it seems important to take stock of the
balance of developments in constructive and destructive directions to help
orient ourselves to the continuing work of peacebuilding. Here again, Kries
berg (2005) set an important precedent with his holistic model of an arc of
intractable conflict based on grievances, identity, means of conducting con
flict, and group goals, influenced by internal and external constraints and
agency. All interact to shape an arc of peacebuilding within otherwise
intractable conflict.
In Northern Ireland, the questions are whether the prevailing constructive
trajectory has stalled and, if so, in what domains, and whether a stall presages
a return to destructive modes of conflict. The peace process itself and succes
sive rounds of political negotiation (such as the Haas/O’Sullivan and Villiers
initiatives) suggest that grievances, goals, and the means of struggle can
often be addressed procedurally, through negotiation and mediation. These
processes are often slow, painstaking, and fraught with political risk. Never
theless, political progress in Northern Ireland has been remarkable, if halting.
The important subjective dimensions of conflicts are slow to change and
difficult to manage. Perhaps the most interesting development in the arc of
Northern Ireland’s conflict since the ceasefires has been the growing empha
sis on ethnonational identity. Sectarianism and ethnopolitical commitments
have always been a prominent feature of conflict in Ireland, but where even
the most fundamental political goals (such as a united Ireland or British
sovereignty in Northern Ireland) could be fudged, ethnic identities and their
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public expression have remained salient. In this dimension, both political and
civil society leaders have repeatedly struggled and failed to reach a consen
sus about multiculturalism, despite decades of groundbreaking community
relations work.
Cherished identities and collective psychological scars require sensitive
interventions by community relations practitioners and innovative citizens
who are themselves committed to ethnopolitical identities and command the
necessary cultural capital to influence their own communities. I have argued
that authentic change in this dimension must be generated from the inside
out, with consistent participation by legitimate community leaders (Smithey
2011). However, debate continues over whether single-identity work {within
as opposed to across ethnonationalist camps) serves to diminish the fears and
insecurities that lead to defensive and sectarian attitudes or whether it merely
serves to further fetishize polarized identities (Nolan et al. 2014).
Finally, we must also consider whether and how public expectations and
perceptions about the pace and trajectories of change impact the trajectories
themselves. At what point does frustration with lack of progress begin to turn
to despair? How can populations in conflicts in transition cultivate the kind
of marathon mentality that is necessary to sustain the work of unraveling
decades of trauma and mistrust, even as destabilizing events persist and new
priorities demand attention? The capacity to continually press for incremen
tal change at the margins of ethnic and political division, especially in the
cultural realm, remains crucial to sustaining Northern Ireland’s ongoing tran
sition toward constructive conflict.

